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and, thus, the Bureau could not feasibly complete an EIS before
critical deadlines for the delivery of irrigation water had passed.
Therefore, to impose impossible duties on the Bureau made "no
sense."
Lastly, the court challenged Kandra's notion that, because the Fish
and Wildlife Service ("FWS") provided the Bureau with contestable
expert opinions, implementing the 2001 plan violated the ESA and
APA. The ESA prevents the Bureau from engaging in any action likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of endangered or threatened
species. It also requires certain due diligence procedures in forming
water plans, such as including reasonable and prudent alternatives
("RPAs") in those plans. The Bureau relied on experts in the FWS
who formulated RPAs. While Kandra claimed the Bureau's experts
failed to use or correctly interpret the best information available, the
court found this insufficient to prove the Bureau acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in violation of the APA.
The court further held the Bureau's ability to choose and rely on
expert opinions allowed for reasonable discretion, not omniscience.
The ESA simply requires expert opinions not ignore biological
information. Kandra had merely argued certain experts disagreed on
the significance of biological information used by the FWS. Thus, the
court held Kandra's ESA claim sought to impose a standard
inconsistent with the standard actually imposed by law.
Considering all of these factors, the court concluded Kandra's
claim failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits or an
entitlement to the relief sought. Accordingly, the court denied
Kandra's motion for a preliminary injunction.
Dan Wennogle
United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 144 F. Supp. 2d 46
(D.P.R. 2001) (holding that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico lacked
jurisdiction over the United States Navy to compel adherence to local
regulations, due to the sovereign immunity of the United States).
The United States moved for a declaratory judgment that the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Commonwealth") and its Secretary
of the Department of Natural and Environmental Resources could not
compel the United States' participation in local administrative
proceedings regarding the adjudication of stream water for use on a
Naval base. The Commonwealth relied on the McCarran Amendment
("Amendment") of 1952, which waived the United States' sovereign
immunity for administrative
proceedings regarding stream
adjudication.
The United States obtained permits granting the
adjudication of stream waters for use on a Navy base in 1942 and 1944,
and thus contended that the permits are not subject to the
Amendment. The court granted declaratory relief.
Congress' purpose in ratifying the Amendment was "allowing states
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to adjudicate collectively all of the conflicting water rights claims on a
source of water, without being hindered by the United States'
invocation of its sovereign immunity." The Commonwealth asserted
that the Amendment of 1952 applied retroactively to proceedings
surrounding the 1942 and 1944 permits. The Amendment "allow[ed]
the United States to be joined as a defendant in any proceeding for
the adjudication or administration of water rights 'where it appears
that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring
water rights."' The United States asserted the court could not apply
the Amendment retroactively, nor had Congress intended to apply it
in such a way.
The court relied on Landgrafv. USI Film Products and E. Enters. v.
Apfel to determine whether the court could apply a statute or
amendment retroactively.
The general rule called for strict
interpretation and application according to the precise terms of such
legislation. "The natural extension of this maxim of interpretation was
that statutory waivers of sovereign immunity are not to be applied
retroactively." The specific rule of Landgraf required a court to
determine whether a piece of legislation "'attaches new legal
consequences"' to prior events. The court found that in the instant
case, application of the Amendment would impair the rights of the
Navy allowed by the 1944 permit and would impose additional duties
upon the Navy. As the retroactive application would have an effect on
the 1944 permit, the court resolved not to retroactively apply the
Amendment in this case.
Since the Commonwealth could not prove clear congressional
intent favoring the retroactive application of the Amendment, the
court held that the Amendment did not apply to the Navy's permits
held before 1952. The court granted declaratory relief, allowing the
United States to use its sovereign immunity to avoid local
administrative proceedings regarding the 1944 permit.
KatharineJEllison
Martin Marietta Materials Southwest, Ltd. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins.
Co., 145 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (holding a decrease in
downstream water was the natural and foreseeable result of diverting a
creek that could conceivably harm downstream users, and neither a
duty to defend nor indemnify existed on behalf of the insurer).
Martin Marietta Materials Southwest, Ltd. ("Marock") owned a
facility near Big Sandy Creek ("Creek"). St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co.
("St. Paul") provided Marock with primary general liability coverage.
Trinity Materials, Inc. ("Trinity"), located downstream of Marock and
holding senior water rights to the creek, alleged Marock diverted the
creek for construction purposes without a valid water permit and,
therefore, deprived Trinity of the water it needed to operate. Trinity

